xlibre-input-elographics-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is a third-party host not affiliated with Arch Linux official repositories or a well-known upstream vendor mirror. The binary is an X input driver (xf86-input-elographics) that will be installed into the system and loaded by the X server, meaning it executes with significant privilege. While XLibre is a known X.Org fork project and the SHA256 checksum is present, the host x11libre.net is not an established, widely-audited distribution channel. The package extracts and installs the binary directly without building from source, bypassing any reproducibility or audit trail. This is a classic supply-chain risk pattern: a prebuilt binary from a personal/project host that could be silently replaced. The sha256sum provides some protection against in-transit tampering but not against the host serving a malicious binary from the start. Rated MEDIUM: real supply-chain concern with an executed binary from an unofficial host, but no evidence of active malice.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-input-elographics-1.4.4.2-1.2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 78%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is a third-party host not affiliated with Arch Linux official repositories or a well-known upstream vendor mirror. The binary is an X input driver (xf86-input-elographics) that will be installed into the system and loaded by the X server, meaning it executes with significant privilege. While XLibre is a known X.Org fork project and the SHA256 checksum is present, the host x11libre.net is not an established, widely-audited distribution channel. The package extracts and installs the binary directly without building from source, bypassing any reproducibility or audit trail. This is a classic supply-chain risk pattern: a prebuilt binary from a personal/project host that could be silently replaced. The sha256sum provides some protection against in-transit tampering but not against the host serving a malicious binary from the start. Rated MEDIUM: real supply-chain concern with an executed binary from an unofficial host, but no evidence of active malice.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
pkgname=xlibre-input-elographics-bin
_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-input-elographics
pkgver=1.4.4.2
pkgrel=1.2
pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org Elographics TouchScreen input driver (binary release)"
arch=(x86_64)
url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
license=('MIT')
groups=('xlibre-drivers')
options=(!strip)
source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-input-elographics-1.4.4.2-1.2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
depends=('glibc')
provides=('xf86-input-elographics' 'xlibre-input-elographics')
conflicts=('xf86-input-elographics' 'xlibre-input-elographics')
sha256sums=('8996da3d95d97d4ad25ad200e7d908b8fe55d49aaaa8bf550abb6dbb0f121a8e')
package() {
tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |