xlibre-input-evdev-bin

maintainer xlibre · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, an unofficial/personal project host, and installs its contents directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against accidental corruption or CDN tampering), the trust anchor is entirely the x11libre.net host operator — there is no GPG signature verification, no comparison against an official upstream release, and no build from source. XLibre is a real X.Org fork project, so this is not obviously malicious, but the pattern of fetching a prebuilt binary from a non-official, non-widely-audited host and executing/installing it constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. The noextract/manual tar extraction pattern also bypasses pacman's normal integrity pipeline. This fits the medium category: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from an unofficial host) that is not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:13 source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-input-evdev-2.11.0.2-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, an unofficial/personal project host, and installs its contents directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against accidental corruption or CDN tampering), the trust anchor is entirely the x11libre.net host operator — there is no GPG signature verification, no comparison against an official upstream release, and no build from source. XLibre is a real X.Org fork project, so this is not obviously malicious, but the pattern of fetching a prebuilt binary from a non-official, non-widely-audited host and executing/installing it constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. The noextract/manual tar extraction pattern also bypasses pacman's normal integrity pipeline. This fits the medium category: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from an unofficial host) that is not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=xlibre-input-evdev-bin
    
      4_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-input-evdev
    
      5pkgver=2.11.0.2
    
      6pkgrel=3
    
      7pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org evdev input driver (binary release)"
    
      8arch=(x86_64)
    
      9url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
    
      10license=('HPND-sell-variant AND MIT')
    
      11groups=('xlibre-drivers')
    
      12options=(!strip)
    
      13source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-input-evdev-2.11.0.2-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
    
      14noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
    
      15depends=('xlibre-server' 'mtdev' 'libevdev' 'glibc')
    
      16provides=('xf86-input-evdev' 'xlibre-input-evdev')
    
      17conflicts=('xf86-input-evdev' 'xlibre-input-evdev')
    
      18
    
      19sha256sums=('51252bf0f7bad736cfd70767698df201ece2d1783f5e5c17aabbf05b3580886e')
    
      20
    
      21package() {
    
      22  tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
    
      23}
    
      24
    
      25

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2