xlibre-input-evdev-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, an unofficial/personal project host, and installs its contents directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against accidental corruption or CDN tampering), the trust anchor is entirely the x11libre.net host operator — there is no GPG signature verification, no comparison against an official upstream release, and no build from source. XLibre is a real X.Org fork project, so this is not obviously malicious, but the pattern of fetching a prebuilt binary from a non-official, non-widely-audited host and executing/installing it constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. The noextract/manual tar extraction pattern also bypasses pacman's normal integrity pipeline. This fits the medium category: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from an unofficial host) that is not clearly malicious.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-input-evdev-2.11.0.2-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, an unofficial/personal project host, and installs its contents directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against accidental corruption or CDN tampering), the trust anchor is entirely the x11libre.net host operator — there is no GPG signature verification, no comparison against an official upstream release, and no build from source. XLibre is a real X.Org fork project, so this is not obviously malicious, but the pattern of fetching a prebuilt binary from a non-official, non-widely-audited host and executing/installing it constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. The noextract/manual tar extraction pattern also bypasses pacman's normal integrity pipeline. This fits the medium category: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from an unofficial host) that is not clearly malicious.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
pkgname=xlibre-input-evdev-bin
_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-input-evdev
pkgver=2.11.0.2
pkgrel=3
pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org evdev input driver (binary release)"
arch=(x86_64)
url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
license=('HPND-sell-variant AND MIT')
groups=('xlibre-drivers')
options=(!strip)
source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-input-evdev-2.11.0.2-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
depends=('xlibre-server' 'mtdev' 'libevdev' 'glibc')
provides=('xf86-input-evdev' 'xlibre-input-evdev')
conflicts=('xf86-input-evdev' 'xlibre-input-evdev')
sha256sums=('51252bf0f7bad736cfd70767698df201ece2d1783f5e5c17aabbf05b3580886e')
package() {
tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |