xlibre-input-synaptics-bin

maintainer xlibre · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is a third-party host for the XLibre project (a fork of X.Org). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against transit tampering), the fundamental concern is that this is a precompiled binary from a non-official, non-Arch-trusted host. XLibre is a real project (a fork of X.Org/Xserver), but x11libre.net is not a recognized official distribution channel like the Arch repos, official upstream GitHub releases, or a well-known CDN. If x11libre.net is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, the binary could contain arbitrary code that gets installed as an X input driver (running with significant system privileges). The noextract + manual tar approach is also slightly unusual but not inherently malicious. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial personal/project host, not clearly malicious but not verifiably safe either.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-input-synaptics-1.10.0.2-1.2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is a third-party host for the XLibre project (a fork of X.Org). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against transit tampering), the fundamental concern is that this is a precompiled binary from a non-official, non-Arch-trusted host. XLibre is a real project (a fork of X.Org/Xserver), but x11libre.net is not a recognized official distribution channel like the Arch repos, official upstream GitHub releases, or a well-known CDN. If x11libre.net is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, the binary could contain arbitrary code that gets installed as an X input driver (running with significant system privileges). The noextract + manual tar approach is also slightly unusual but not inherently malicious. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial personal/project host, not clearly malicious but not verifiably safe either.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
2
3pkgname=xlibre-input-synaptics-bin
4_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-input-synaptics
5pkgver=1.10.0.2
6pkgrel=1.2
7pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org Synaptics driver for notebook touchpads (binary release)"
8arch=(x86_64)
9url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
10license=('MIT')
11groups=('xlibre-drivers')
12options=(!strip)
13source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-input-synaptics-1.10.0.2-1.2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
14noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
15depends=('libxtst' 'libevdev' 'libx11' 'libxi' 'glibc')
16provides=('xf86-input-synaptics' 'xlibre-input-synaptics' 'synaptics')
17conflicts=('xf86-input-synaptics' 'xlibre-input-synaptics' 'X-ABI-XINPUT_VERSION<26' 'X-ABI-XINPUT_VERSION>=27' 'synaptics')
18replaces=('synaptics')
19
20sha256sums=('0b5cb666c0fc773478fa77496e70d1fc19d1c5ec2ee806d28de0a05acd308aec')
21
22package() {
23 tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
24}
25
26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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