xlibre-input-synaptics-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is a third-party host for the XLibre project (a fork of X.Org). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against transit tampering), the fundamental concern is that this is a precompiled binary from a non-official, non-Arch-trusted host. XLibre is a real project (a fork of X.Org/Xserver), but x11libre.net is not a recognized official distribution channel like the Arch repos, official upstream GitHub releases, or a well-known CDN. If x11libre.net is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, the binary could contain arbitrary code that gets installed as an X input driver (running with significant system privileges). The noextract + manual tar approach is also slightly unusual but not inherently malicious. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial personal/project host, not clearly malicious but not verifiably safe either.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-input-synaptics-1.10.0.2-1.2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is a third-party host for the XLibre project (a fork of X.Org). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against transit tampering), the fundamental concern is that this is a precompiled binary from a non-official, non-Arch-trusted host. XLibre is a real project (a fork of X.Org/Xserver), but x11libre.net is not a recognized official distribution channel like the Arch repos, official upstream GitHub releases, or a well-known CDN. If x11libre.net is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, the binary could contain arbitrary code that gets installed as an X input driver (running with significant system privileges). The noextract + manual tar approach is also slightly unusual but not inherently malicious. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial personal/project host, not clearly malicious but not verifiably safe either.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
pkgname=xlibre-input-synaptics-bin
_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-input-synaptics
pkgver=1.10.0.2
pkgrel=1.2
pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org Synaptics driver for notebook touchpads (binary release)"
arch=(x86_64)
url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
license=('MIT')
groups=('xlibre-drivers')
options=(!strip)
source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-input-synaptics-1.10.0.2-1.2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
depends=('libxtst' 'libevdev' 'libx11' 'libxi' 'glibc')
provides=('xf86-input-synaptics' 'xlibre-input-synaptics' 'synaptics')
conflicts=('xf86-input-synaptics' 'xlibre-input-synaptics' 'X-ABI-XINPUT_VERSION<26' 'X-ABI-XINPUT_VERSION>=27' 'synaptics')
replaces=('synaptics')
sha256sums=('0b5cb666c0fc773478fa77496e70d1fc19d1c5ec2ee806d28de0a05acd308aec')
package() {
tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |