xlibre-server-common-bin

maintainer xlibre · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (xlibre-xserver-common-25.0.0.21-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is not an official Arch Linux mirror or a widely recognized upstream distribution point. XLibre is a real fork of X.Org (it exists as a project), but the binary is served from a personal/project-controlled host rather than built from source. The package then extracts and installs the binary directly into pkgdir, meaning whatever is in that tarball gets installed as root-level system files (under /usr and /var). A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution attacks somewhat, but does not protect against the host serving malicious content from the start. Since this installs an X server component (a privileged, deeply integrated system binary) from a non-standard third-party host without building from source, this represents a genuine supply-chain risk: if x11libre.net is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, arbitrary code could be executed with elevated privileges on the target system. The medium rating is appropriate.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:28 source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-xserver-common-25.0.0.21-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (xlibre-xserver-common-25.0.0.21-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is not an official Arch Linux mirror or a widely recognized upstream distribution point. XLibre is a real fork of X.Org (it exists as a project), but the binary is served from a personal/project-controlled host rather than built from source. The package then extracts and installs the binary directly into pkgdir, meaning whatever is in that tarball gets installed as root-level system files (under /usr and /var). A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution attacks somewhat, but does not protect against the host serving malicious content from the start. Since this installs an X server component (a privileged, deeply integrated system binary) from a non-standard third-party host without building from source, this represents a genuine supply-chain risk: if x11libre.net is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, arbitrary code could be executed with elevated privileges on the target system. The medium rating is appropriate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: artist for XLibre <artist4xlibre@proton.me>
2
3_pkgname=xlibre-server-common
4_orgpkgname=xlibre-xserver-common
5pkgname=$_pkgname-bin
6pkgver=25.0.0.21
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org Xorg server common files (binary release)"
9arch=(x86_64)
10url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
11license=('LicenseRef-Adobe-Display-PostScript'
12 'BSD-3-Clause'
13 'LicenseRef-DEC-3-Clause'
14 'HPND'
15 'LicenseRef-HPND-sell-MIT-disclaimer-xserver'
16 'HPND-sell-variant'
17 'ICU'
18 'ISC'
19 'MIT'
20 'MIT-open-group'
21 'NTP'
22 'SGI-B-2.0'
23 'SMLNJ'
24 'X11'
25 'X11-distribute-modifications-variant')
26groups=('xlibre')
27options=(!strip)
28source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-xserver-common-25.0.0.21-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
29noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
30depends=(xkeyboard-config xorg-xkbcomp xorg-setxkbmap)
31provides=($_pkgname 'xorg-server-common')
32conflicts=($_pkgname 'xorg-server-common')
33
34sha256sums=('ab7b3dd752e5e00e9398316a96f98da9c958183e739522f2cf7f971d1a31cdf7')
35
36package() {
37 tar -xf "${_orgpkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr var
38}
39
40

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
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