xlibre-server-xvfb-bin

maintainer xlibre · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled X server component) from x11libre.net, which is a third-party/unofficial host rather than an official distribution mirror or well-known upstream release infrastructure. XLibre is a real fork of X.Org (it exists and has a community), but x11libre.net is not a widely audited or trusted binary host. The package installs an executed binary (Xvfb virtual framebuffer X server) directly from this host. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates tampering in transit, but does not protect against the host serving a malicious binary in the first place. The supply-chain risk is real: if x11libre.net is compromised or the maintainer of that host is malicious, users would install a backdoored X server binary with significant system access. This is a classic medium-severity supply-chain concern — not clearly malicious, but a prebuilt binary from an unofficial personal/project host with no reproducible build verification.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:28 source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-xserver-xvfb-25.0.0.21-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled X server component) from x11libre.net, which is a third-party/unofficial host rather than an official distribution mirror or well-known upstream release infrastructure. XLibre is a real fork of X.Org (it exists and has a community), but x11libre.net is not a widely audited or trusted binary host. The package installs an executed binary (Xvfb virtual framebuffer X server) directly from this host. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates tampering in transit, but does not protect against the host serving a malicious binary in the first place. The supply-chain risk is real: if x11libre.net is compromised or the maintainer of that host is malicious, users would install a backdoored X server binary with significant system access. This is a classic medium-severity supply-chain concern — not clearly malicious, but a prebuilt binary from an unofficial personal/project host with no reproducible build verification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
2
3_pkgname=xlibre-server-xvfb
4_orgpkgname=xlibre-xserver-xvfb
5pkgname=$_pkgname-bin
6pkgver=25.0.0.21
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org virtual framebuffer X server (binary release)"
9arch=(x86_64)
10url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
11license=('LicenseRef-Adobe-Display-PostScript'
12 'BSD-3-Clause'
13 'LicenseRef-DEC-3-Clause'
14 'HPND'
15 'LicenseRef-HPND-sell-MIT-disclaimer-xserver'
16 'HPND-sell-variant'
17 'ICU'
18 'ISC'
19 'MIT'
20 'MIT-open-group'
21 'NTP'
22 'SGI-B-2.0'
23 'SMLNJ'
24 'X11'
25 'X11-distribute-modifications-variant')
26groups=('xlibre')
27options=(!strip)
28source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-xserver-xvfb-25.0.0.21-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
29noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
30depends=(xlibre-server-common-bin 'X-ABI-XINPUT_VERSION=26.0' libxfont2 libunwind pixman xorg-xauth
31 libgl nettle libtirpc libxdmcp sh glibc libxau)
32provides=($_pkgname 'xorg-server-xvfb' 'xlibre-server-xvfb')
33conflicts=($_pkgname 'xorg-server-xvfb' 'xlibre-server-xvfb')
34
35sha256sums=('247f36fc3fac9a079ed76afb9e41d09a7eee832945253c4b02ee545470f73e18')
36
37package() {
38 tar -xf "${_orgpkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
39}
40
41

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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