xlibre-video-dummy-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is a third-party host not affiliated with the official Arch Linux or X.Org infrastructure. The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against transit tampering), the trust anchor is entirely the x11libre.net domain — if that domain is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, arbitrary binaries could be executed on the user's system. XLibre is a real X.Org fork project, but distributing prebuilt binaries from a personal/project website rather than building from source is a genuine supply-chain concern: there is no way to verify the binary matches any published source code, and the build is not reproducible. This is a classic medium-severity pattern: executed binary from an unofficial/personal host with no source build.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-dummy-0.4.1.4-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is a third-party host not affiliated with the official Arch Linux or X.Org infrastructure. The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against transit tampering), the trust anchor is entirely the x11libre.net domain — if that domain is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, arbitrary binaries could be executed on the user's system. XLibre is a real X.Org fork project, but distributing prebuilt binaries from a personal/project website rather than building from source is a genuine supply-chain concern: there is no way to verify the binary matches any published source code, and the build is not reproducible. This is a classic medium-severity pattern: executed binary from an unofficial/personal host with no source build.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
pkgname=xlibre-video-dummy-bin
_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-video-dummy
pkgver=0.4.1.4
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org dummy video driver (binary release)"
arch=(x86_64)
url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
license=('MIT AND X11')
groups=('xlibre-drivers')
options=(!strip)
source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-dummy-0.4.1.4-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
depends=('glibc')
provides=('xf86-video-dummy' 'xlibre-video-dummy')
conflicts=('xf86-video-dummy' 'xlibre-video-dummy' 'xorg-server<21.1.1' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION<28' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION>=29')
sha256sums=('1b7e6b1d44669eaf6dd74a2603fd8381264a2af9280d2d69d2b01b97904bf312')
package() {
tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |