xlibre-video-qxl-bin

maintainer xlibre · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled Xorg video driver .pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, a personal/project host that is not an official Arch Linux mirror or well-known vendor CDN. The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is present, it only protects against accidental corruption or a one-time swap — it provides no cryptographic authenticity guarantee (no GPG signature verification). The core concern is that a prebuilt, executed binary (an Xorg DDX driver loaded into the X server process) is sourced from an unofficial third-party host. If x11libre.net were compromised or the domain transferred, a malicious binary could be substituted with a new matching checksum pushed to the PKGBUILD. The XLibre project is a real X.Org fork, but distributing prebuilt binaries from a personal project host rather than building from source is a genuine supply-chain risk for executed code. This is a textbook medium-severity concern.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-qxl-0.1.6.3-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled Xorg video driver .pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, a personal/project host that is not an official Arch Linux mirror or well-known vendor CDN. The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is present, it only protects against accidental corruption or a one-time swap — it provides no cryptographic authenticity guarantee (no GPG signature verification). The core concern is that a prebuilt, executed binary (an Xorg DDX driver loaded into the X server process) is sourced from an unofficial third-party host. If x11libre.net were compromised or the domain transferred, a malicious binary could be substituted with a new matching checksum pushed to the PKGBUILD. The XLibre project is a real X.Org fork, but distributing prebuilt binaries from a personal project host rather than building from source is a genuine supply-chain risk for executed code. This is a textbook medium-severity concern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
2
3pkgname=xlibre-video-qxl-bin
4_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-video-qxl
5pkgver=0.1.6.3
6pkgrel=2
7pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org qxl video driver (binary release)"
8arch=(x86_64)
9url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
10license=('MIT')
11groups=('xlibre-drivers')
12options=(!strip)
13source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-qxl-0.1.6.3-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
14noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
15depends=('spice' 'libxfont2' 'glibc')
16optdepends=('python: for Xspice')
17provides=('xf86-video-qxl' 'xlibre-video-qxl')
18conflicts=('xf86-video-qxl' 'xlibre-video-qxl' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION<28' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION>=29')
19
20sha256sums=('3396dead1d96345b690d989ed84d2d5f29ea0c93ae2b1dd3c0eb57619a0d5f9e')
21
22package() {
23 tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
24}
25
26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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