xlibre-video-qxl-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled Xorg video driver .pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, a personal/project host that is not an official Arch Linux mirror or well-known vendor CDN. The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is present, it only protects against accidental corruption or a one-time swap — it provides no cryptographic authenticity guarantee (no GPG signature verification). The core concern is that a prebuilt, executed binary (an Xorg DDX driver loaded into the X server process) is sourced from an unofficial third-party host. If x11libre.net were compromised or the domain transferred, a malicious binary could be substituted with a new matching checksum pushed to the PKGBUILD. The XLibre project is a real X.Org fork, but distributing prebuilt binaries from a personal project host rather than building from source is a genuine supply-chain risk for executed code. This is a textbook medium-severity concern.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-qxl-0.1.6.3-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled Xorg video driver .pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, a personal/project host that is not an official Arch Linux mirror or well-known vendor CDN. The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is present, it only protects against accidental corruption or a one-time swap — it provides no cryptographic authenticity guarantee (no GPG signature verification). The core concern is that a prebuilt, executed binary (an Xorg DDX driver loaded into the X server process) is sourced from an unofficial third-party host. If x11libre.net were compromised or the domain transferred, a malicious binary could be substituted with a new matching checksum pushed to the PKGBUILD. The XLibre project is a real X.Org fork, but distributing prebuilt binaries from a personal project host rather than building from source is a genuine supply-chain risk for executed code. This is a textbook medium-severity concern.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
pkgname=xlibre-video-qxl-bin
_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-video-qxl
pkgver=0.1.6.3
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org qxl video driver (binary release)"
arch=(x86_64)
url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
license=('MIT')
groups=('xlibre-drivers')
options=(!strip)
source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-qxl-0.1.6.3-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
depends=('spice' 'libxfont2' 'glibc')
optdepends=('python: for Xspice')
provides=('xf86-video-qxl' 'xlibre-video-qxl')
conflicts=('xf86-video-qxl' 'xlibre-video-qxl' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION<28' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION>=29')
sha256sums=('3396dead1d96345b690d989ed84d2d5f29ea0c93ae2b1dd3c0eb57619a0d5f9e')
package() {
tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |