xlibre-video-sisusb-bin

maintainer xlibre · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary X.Org/XLibre video driver from x11libre.net, a non-standard third-party host. The binary is extracted directly into the package directory (usr/ tree), meaning it will install compiled shared libraries and potentially kernel-interfacing code that runs with X server privileges. While x11libre.net appears to be the official host for the XLibre project (a fork of X.Org), it is not an established, widely-trusted distribution channel like upstream vendor releases or major language ecosystem mirrors. There is no GPG signature verification — only a sha256sum — meaning if the host is compromised or the file is substituted, the only protection is the hash. The sha256sum does provide integrity checking against the specific known-good file, which mitigates (but does not eliminate) supply-chain risk. The concern is real but not clearly malicious: a prebuilt binary X driver from a personal/small-project host with no signature verification is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-sisusb-0.9.7.2-1.2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary X.Org/XLibre video driver from x11libre.net, a non-standard third-party host. The binary is extracted directly into the package directory (usr/ tree), meaning it will install compiled shared libraries and potentially kernel-interfacing code that runs with X server privileges. While x11libre.net appears to be the official host for the XLibre project (a fork of X.Org), it is not an established, widely-trusted distribution channel like upstream vendor releases or major language ecosystem mirrors. There is no GPG signature verification — only a sha256sum — meaning if the host is compromised or the file is substituted, the only protection is the hash. The sha256sum does provide integrity checking against the specific known-good file, which mitigates (but does not eliminate) supply-chain risk. The concern is real but not clearly malicious: a prebuilt binary X driver from a personal/small-project host with no signature verification is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
2
3pkgname=xlibre-video-sisusb-bin
4_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-video-sisusb
5pkgver=0.9.7.2
6pkgrel=1.2
7pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org sisusb video driver (binary release)"
8arch=(x86_64)
9url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
10license=('BSD-3-Clause')
11groups=('xlibre-drivers')
12options=(!strip)
13source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-sisusb-0.9.7.2-1.2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
14noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
15depends=('mesa' 'libdrm' 'glibc')
16provides=('xf86-video-sisusb' 'xlibre-video-sisusb')
17conflicts=('xf86-video-sisusb' 'xlibre-video-sisusb' 'xorg-server<21.1.1' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION<28' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION>=29')
18
19sha256sums=('1bfc75bb86bd62cf79e69bd05b2536906aa0ce8f15c8997209ce9988202c7815')
20
21package() {
22 tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
23}
24
25

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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