xlibre-video-sisusb-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary X.Org/XLibre video driver from x11libre.net, a non-standard third-party host. The binary is extracted directly into the package directory (usr/ tree), meaning it will install compiled shared libraries and potentially kernel-interfacing code that runs with X server privileges. While x11libre.net appears to be the official host for the XLibre project (a fork of X.Org), it is not an established, widely-trusted distribution channel like upstream vendor releases or major language ecosystem mirrors. There is no GPG signature verification — only a sha256sum — meaning if the host is compromised or the file is substituted, the only protection is the hash. The sha256sum does provide integrity checking against the specific known-good file, which mitigates (but does not eliminate) supply-chain risk. The concern is real but not clearly malicious: a prebuilt binary X driver from a personal/small-project host with no signature verification is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-sisusb-0.9.7.2-1.2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary X.Org/XLibre video driver from x11libre.net, a non-standard third-party host. The binary is extracted directly into the package directory (usr/ tree), meaning it will install compiled shared libraries and potentially kernel-interfacing code that runs with X server privileges. While x11libre.net appears to be the official host for the XLibre project (a fork of X.Org), it is not an established, widely-trusted distribution channel like upstream vendor releases or major language ecosystem mirrors. There is no GPG signature verification — only a sha256sum — meaning if the host is compromised or the file is substituted, the only protection is the hash. The sha256sum does provide integrity checking against the specific known-good file, which mitigates (but does not eliminate) supply-chain risk. The concern is real but not clearly malicious: a prebuilt binary X driver from a personal/small-project host with no signature verification is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
pkgname=xlibre-video-sisusb-bin
_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-video-sisusb
pkgver=0.9.7.2
pkgrel=1.2
pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org sisusb video driver (binary release)"
arch=(x86_64)
url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
license=('BSD-3-Clause')
groups=('xlibre-drivers')
options=(!strip)
source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-sisusb-0.9.7.2-1.2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
depends=('mesa' 'libdrm' 'glibc')
provides=('xf86-video-sisusb' 'xlibre-video-sisusb')
conflicts=('xf86-video-sisusb' 'xlibre-video-sisusb' 'xorg-server<21.1.1' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION<28' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION>=29')
sha256sums=('1bfc75bb86bd62cf79e69bd05b2536906aa0ce8f15c8997209ce9988202c7815')
package() {
tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |