xlibre-video-vesa-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer xlibre 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled X.org video driver) from x11libre.net, which is a self-hosted distribution mirror rather than the upstream GitHub repository (github.com/X11Libre). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided, this only protects against accidental corruption or a one-time swap — it does not protect against the host serving a malicious binary from the start, nor against future checksum updates in the PKGBUILD pointing to a compromised binary. The core concern is that a prebuilt kernel/X.org driver binary from a personal/project-controlled host (not a well-known, audited mirror) is being installed into a privileged location and loaded by the X server, giving it significant system access. XLibre is a real fork of X.Org (https://github.com/X11Libre exists), so this is not clearly malicious, but the pattern of bypassing source builds in favor of opaque binaries from a self-hosted server is a genuine supply-chain risk that warrants medium severity.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled X.org video driver) from x11libre.net, which is a self-hosted distribution mirror rather than the upstream GitHub repository (github.com/X11Libre). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided, this only protects against accidental corruption or a one-time swap — it does not protect against the host serving a malicious binary from the start, nor against future checksum updates in the PKGBUILD pointing to a compromised binary. The core concern is that a prebuilt kernel/X.org driver binary from a personal/project-controlled host (not a well-known, audited mirror) is being installed into a privileged location and loaded by the X server, giving it significant system access. XLibre is a real fork of X.Org (https://github.com/X11Libre exists), so this is not clearly malicious, but the pattern of bypassing source builds in favor of opaque binaries from a self-hosted server is a genuine supply-chain risk that warrants medium severity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: artist for XLibre <artist4xlibre@proton.me>
2
3pkgname=xlibre-video-vesa-bin
4_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-video-vesa
5pkgver=2.6.0.4
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org vesa video driver (binary release)"
8arch=(x86_64)
9url="https://github.com/X11Libre"
10license=('MIT')
11groups=('xlibre-drivers')
12options=(!strip)
13source=("https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
14noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
15depends=('glibc')
16provides=('xf86-video-vesa' 'xlibre-video-vesa')
17conflicts=('xf86-video-vesa' 'xlibre-video-vesa' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION<28' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION>=29')
18
19sha256sums=('93e2eca288b9c15de319ffd7e06815e74305aa4fc5c28cb857843f356eb6cfba')
20
21package() {
22 tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
23}
24
25

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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