xlibre-video-vesa-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled X.org video driver) from x11libre.net, which is a self-hosted distribution mirror rather than the upstream GitHub repository (github.com/X11Libre). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided, this only protects against accidental corruption or a one-time swap — it does not protect against the host serving a malicious binary from the start, nor against future checksum updates in the PKGBUILD pointing to a compromised binary. The core concern is that a prebuilt kernel/X.org driver binary from a personal/project-controlled host (not a well-known, audited mirror) is being installed into a privileged location and loaded by the X server, giving it significant system access. XLibre is a real fork of X.Org (https://github.com/X11Libre exists), so this is not clearly malicious, but the pattern of bypassing source builds in favor of opaque binaries from a self-hosted server is a genuine supply-chain risk that warrants medium severity.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=("https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled X.org video driver) from x11libre.net, which is a self-hosted distribution mirror rather than the upstream GitHub repository (github.com/X11Libre). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided, this only protects against accidental corruption or a one-time swap — it does not protect against the host serving a malicious binary from the start, nor against future checksum updates in the PKGBUILD pointing to a compromised binary. The core concern is that a prebuilt kernel/X.org driver binary from a personal/project-controlled host (not a well-known, audited mirror) is being installed into a privileged location and loaded by the X server, giving it significant system access. XLibre is a real fork of X.Org (https://github.com/X11Libre exists), so this is not clearly malicious, but the pattern of bypassing source builds in favor of opaque binaries from a self-hosted server is a genuine supply-chain risk that warrants medium severity.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: artist for XLibre <artist4xlibre@proton.me>
pkgname=xlibre-video-vesa-bin
_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-video-vesa
pkgver=2.6.0.4
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org vesa video driver (binary release)"
arch=(x86_64)
url="https://github.com/X11Libre"
license=('MIT')
groups=('xlibre-drivers')
options=(!strip)
source=("https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
depends=('glibc')
provides=('xf86-video-vesa' 'xlibre-video-vesa')
conflicts=('xf86-video-vesa' 'xlibre-video-vesa' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION<28' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION>=29')
sha256sums=('93e2eca288b9c15de319ffd7e06815e74305aa4fc5c28cb857843f356eb6cfba')
package() {
tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |