xlibre-video-vmware-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer xlibre 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled X.Org/XLibre video driver) from x11libre.net, which is an unofficial/personal project host rather than an official distribution mirror or well-known vendor CDN. The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against transit tampering), the trust anchor is entirely the x11libre.net host operator — if that host is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, an arbitrary binary with X server privileges could be delivered to users. XLibre itself appears to be a fork/continuation project of X.Org, so the domain is at least thematically consistent, but it is not an established, widely-audited source. The pattern of wrapping a foreign binary repo's package inside an AUR PKGBUILD is a recognized supply-chain risk vector: the AUR package bypasses normal Arch repository vetting, and the inner package is a compiled binary from a third-party host. This is a genuine medium-severity concern — not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain risk due to executed binary code from an unofficial host.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-vmware-13.4.0.3-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled X.Org/XLibre video driver) from x11libre.net, which is an unofficial/personal project host rather than an official distribution mirror or well-known vendor CDN. The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against transit tampering), the trust anchor is entirely the x11libre.net host operator — if that host is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, an arbitrary binary with X server privileges could be delivered to users. XLibre itself appears to be a fork/continuation project of X.Org, so the domain is at least thematically consistent, but it is not an established, widely-audited source. The pattern of wrapping a foreign binary repo's package inside an AUR PKGBUILD is a recognized supply-chain risk vector: the AUR package bypasses normal Arch repository vetting, and the inner package is a compiled binary from a third-party host. This is a genuine medium-severity concern — not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain risk due to executed binary code from an unofficial host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
2
3pkgname=xlibre-video-vmware-bin
4_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-video-vmware
5pkgver=13.4.0.3
6pkgrel=2
7pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org vmware video driver (binary release)"
8arch=(x86_64)
9url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
10license=('MIT AND X11')
11groups=('xlibre-drivers')
12options=(!strip)
13source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-vmware-13.4.0.3-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
14noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
15depends=('glibc' 'libxext' 'libx11' 'libdrm' 'glibc')
16provides=('xf86-video-vmware' 'xlibre-video-vmware')
17conflicts=('xf86-video-vmware' 'xlibre-video-vmware' 'xorg-server<21.1.1' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION<28' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION>=29')
18
19sha256sums=('7bc535d63647ddd834df3ef4f3dd0fb098a7e26d09dff54e1e6769c668a8a346')
20
21package() {
22 tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
23}
24
25

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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