xlibre-video-voodoo-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer xlibre 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is not an official Arch Linux mirror or a widely recognized upstream source. XLibre is a real fork of X.Org (announced in 2025), but x11libre.net is a personal/project host with no established trust chain in the broader Linux ecosystem. The package extracts and installs a prebuilt X11 video driver binary directly into the system, bypassing any source-based verification. While a sha256sum is provided, this only verifies integrity against a hash the maintainer controls — it does not establish authenticity. A compromised or malicious binary at this URL would be installed as a privileged X11 driver. The noextract+manual tar pattern is used to unpack a nested Arch package, which is unusual but not inherently malicious. The core concern is a prebuilt binary from an unofficial host being installed as a system driver component, which is a genuine supply-chain risk warranting medium severity.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-voodoo-1.2.6.3-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is not an official Arch Linux mirror or a widely recognized upstream source. XLibre is a real fork of X.Org (announced in 2025), but x11libre.net is a personal/project host with no established trust chain in the broader Linux ecosystem. The package extracts and installs a prebuilt X11 video driver binary directly into the system, bypassing any source-based verification. While a sha256sum is provided, this only verifies integrity against a hash the maintainer controls — it does not establish authenticity. A compromised or malicious binary at this URL would be installed as a privileged X11 driver. The noextract+manual tar pattern is used to unpack a nested Arch package, which is unusual but not inherently malicious. The core concern is a prebuilt binary from an unofficial host being installed as a system driver component, which is a genuine supply-chain risk warranting medium severity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
2
3pkgname=xlibre-video-voodoo-bin
4_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-video-voodoo
5pkgver=1.2.6.3
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org voodoo video driver (binary release)"
8arch=(x86_64)
9url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
10license=('MIT')
11groups=('xlibre-drivers')
12options=(!strip)
13source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-voodoo-1.2.6.3-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
14noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
15depends=('glibc')
16provides=('xlibre-video-voodoo' 'xf86-video-voodoo')
17conflicts=('xlibre-video-voodoo' 'xf86-video-voodoo' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION<28' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION>=29')
18
19sha256sums=('445357312902f8a742647f30ec797712369aa19746083dcbe3a2252f15469940')
20
21package() {
22 tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
23}
24
25

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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