xlibre-video-voodoo-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer xlibre 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is not an official Arch Linux mirror or a widely recognized upstream source. XLibre is a real fork of X.Org (announced in 2025), but x11libre.net is a personal/project host with no established trust chain in the broader Linux ecosystem. The package extracts and installs a prebuilt X11 video driver binary directly into the system, bypassing any source-based verification. While a sha256sum is provided, this only verifies integrity against a hash the maintainer controls — it does not establish authenticity. A compromised or malicious binary at this URL would be installed as a privileged X11 driver. The noextract+manual tar pattern is used to unpack a nested Arch package, which is unusual but not inherently malicious. The core concern is a prebuilt binary from an unofficial host being installed as a system driver component, which is a genuine supply-chain risk warranting medium severity.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-voodoo-1.2.6.3-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, which is not an official Arch Linux mirror or a widely recognized upstream source. XLibre is a real fork of X.Org (announced in 2025), but x11libre.net is a personal/project host with no established trust chain in the broader Linux ecosystem. The package extracts and installs a prebuilt X11 video driver binary directly into the system, bypassing any source-based verification. While a sha256sum is provided, this only verifies integrity against a hash the maintainer controls — it does not establish authenticity. A compromised or malicious binary at this URL would be installed as a privileged X11 driver. The noextract+manual tar pattern is used to unpack a nested Arch package, which is unusual but not inherently malicious. The core concern is a prebuilt binary from an unofficial host being installed as a system driver component, which is a genuine supply-chain risk warranting medium severity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: artist for Xlibre
2
3pkgname=xlibre-video-voodoo-bin
4_pkgname=xlibre-xf86-video-voodoo
5pkgver=1.2.6.3
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="XLibre Official Easy Install Drop in Replacement fork of X.Org voodoo video driver (binary release)"
8arch=(x86_64)
9url=https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64
10license=('MIT')
11groups=('xlibre-drivers')
12options=(!strip)
13source=(https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/xlibre-video-voodoo-1.2.6.3-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst)
14noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
15depends=('glibc')
16provides=('xlibre-video-voodoo' 'xf86-video-voodoo')
17conflicts=('xlibre-video-voodoo' 'xf86-video-voodoo' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION<28' 'X-ABI-VIDEODRV_VERSION>=29')
18
19sha256sums=('445357312902f8a742647f30ec797712369aa19746083dcbe3a2252f15469940')
20
21package() {
22 tar -xf "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
23}
24
25

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion