xrphd-qt

maintainer orphaned · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary tarball (xrphd-qt executable plus shared libraries) directly from xrphd.org, which is the project's own website but is not a well-known, audited distribution channel. The binary is not built from source, so users must trust that the host serves the exact binary matching the fixed sha256sum and that the host has not been compromised. The sha256 checksum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against a deliberate substitution at the source host. The installed content includes both an executable (xrphd-qt) and a directory of shared libraries (cp -r xhd-v$pkgver/lib/*), all of which run with user privileges. This is a classic supply-chain risk pattern: prebuilt binaries from a single, non-mirrored, non-reproducible personal/project host. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is correct — this is not clearly malicious, but it is a real supply-chain concern due to the use of unaudited prebuilt binaries and libraries from a non-standard host.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:10 source=("https://xrphd.org/public/wallets/xhd-v$pkgver.0-$commit-x86_64-linux-gnu.tar.gz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary tarball (xrphd-qt executable plus shared libraries) directly from xrphd.org, which is the project's own website but is not a well-known, audited distribution channel. The binary is not built from source, so users must trust that the host serves the exact binary matching the fixed sha256sum and that the host has not been compromised. The sha256 checksum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against a deliberate substitution at the source host. The installed content includes both an executable (xrphd-qt) and a directory of shared libraries (cp -r xhd-v$pkgver/lib/*), all of which run with user privileges. This is a classic supply-chain risk pattern: prebuilt binaries from a single, non-mirrored, non-reproducible personal/project host. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is correct — this is not clearly malicious, but it is a real supply-chain concern due to the use of unaudited prebuilt binaries and libraries from a non-standard host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Ben Westover <kwestover [dot] kw [at] gmail [dot] com>
2
3pkgname='xrphd-qt'
4pkgver=1.0.5
5pkgrel=1
6commit=8e6dd60
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://xrphd.org"
9license=('MIT')
10source=("https://xrphd.org/public/wallets/xhd-v$pkgver.0-$commit-x86_64-linux-gnu.tar.gz"
11 "xrphd-qt.desktop"
12 "xhd-qt.sh"
13 "xrphd128.png")
14sha256sums=('590f596b5ebba73c986fca91dd0d6acbc24b57fbcc356c8f599a4dabe2441836'
15 '498ec02ea83c0eaedc159c31945360da608031cf05c743c1d4b0ef3b8721c274'
16 '4099187d23fab321e85e792d5189a44b7571997d38c343f6354ae903adcbf80e'
17 '5d8aa9d0cbf873fa08c23890ec37a237ddd822277652e87d20b999b8dac1f7a4')
18
19package() {
20 pkgdesc="XRPHD is a peer-to-peer network based digital currency"
21 depends=(boost-libs libevent qt5-base miniupnpc libminiupnpc.so qrencode protobuf zeromq)
22
23 install -Dm755 xhd-v$pkgver/bin/xrphd-qt $pkgdir/usr/bin/xrphd-qt
24 install -Dm644 xhd-v$pkgver/share/man/man1/xrphd-qt.1 $pkgdir/usr/share/man/man1/xrphd-qt.1
25
26 install -Dm644 xrphd128.png $pkgdir/usr/share/pixmaps/xrphd128.png
27 install -Dm755 xhd-qt.sh $pkgdir/usr/local/bin/xhd-qt
28 install -Dm644 xrphd-qt.desktop $pkgdir/usr/share/applications/xrphd-qt.desktop
29
30 mkdir -p $pkgdir/usr/lib/xrphd
31 cp -r xhd-v$pkgver/lib/* $pkgdir/usr/lib/xrphd
32}
33

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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