xvolkolak
The package downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (an unpacker emulator tool) from libpcap.net, which is the maintainer's personal domain rather than the official upstream release host (which is commented out as a Dropbox URL). The comment even acknowledges the official source is the Dropbox link and that the libpcap.net mirror was set up by the maintainer via wget mirroring. This is a classic supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable is being served from a personal server controlled by the package maintainer, not the upstream author. If the maintainer's server were compromised or the maintainer acted maliciously, a different binary could be substituted. The sha256sum provides some protection against silent substitution but not against the maintainer intentionally serving a malicious binary. The 'base' directory likely contains native binaries (it's an unpacker emulator), and shell scripts are installed to /usr/bin. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binaries from a non-official personal host.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=("http://libpcap.net/xvolkolak/xvlk_lin64_public_${pkgver}.tar.gz")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (an unpacker emulator tool) from libpcap.net, which is the maintainer's personal domain rather than the official upstream release host (which is commented out as a Dropbox URL). The comment even acknowledges the official source is the Dropbox link and that the libpcap.net mirror was set up by the maintainer via wget mirroring. This is a classic supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable is being served from a personal server controlled by the package maintainer, not the upstream author. If the maintainer's server were compromised or the maintainer acted maliciously, a different binary could be substituted. The sha256sum provides some protection against silent substitution but not against the maintainer intentionally serving a malicious binary. The 'base' directory likely contains native binaries (it's an unpacker emulator), and shell scripts are installed to /usr/bin. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binaries from a non-official personal host.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Tony Lambiris <tony@libpcap.net>
pkgname=xvolkolak
pkgver=0.22
pkgrel=3
pkgdesc="Xvolkolak is an unpacker emulator"
arch=(x86_64)
url="http://n10info.blogspot.com/"
license=(custom)
depends=(glibc)
# official source below
#source=('https://www.dropbox.com/s/7sk61nc798kcg32/xvlk_lin64_public_0.22.tar.gz?dl=1')
# wget --mirror --no-parent --convert-links --directory-prefix=xvolkolak --html-extension --restrict-file-names=windows http://n10info.blogspot.com/2018/08/xvolkolak-022.html
source=("http://libpcap.net/xvolkolak/xvlk_lin64_public_${pkgver}.tar.gz")
install="$pkgname.install"
sha256sums=('4b77ce5eab33314b13b7982cffdd7526b7a8f3575945ad13aae3ec1a79d95035')
package() {
mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/share/xvolkolak" "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
cp -a "${srcdir}/xvlk_lin64_public/base" "$pkgdir/usr/share/xvolkolak/"
cp -a "${srcdir}/xvlk_lin64_public/xvlkc.sh" \
"${srcdir}/xvlk_lin64_public/xvlk.sh" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/"
sed -i -re 's|./base|/usr/share/xvolkolak/base|g' "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin/*.sh
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |