xvolkolak

MEDIUM
maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
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Why flagged

The package downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (an unpacker emulator tool) from libpcap.net, which is the maintainer's personal domain rather than the official upstream release host (which is commented out as a Dropbox URL). The comment even acknowledges the official source is the Dropbox link and that the libpcap.net mirror was set up by the maintainer via wget mirroring. This is a classic supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable is being served from a personal server controlled by the package maintainer, not the upstream author. If the maintainer's server were compromised or the maintainer acted maliciously, a different binary could be substituted. The sha256sum provides some protection against silent substitution but not against the maintainer intentionally serving a malicious binary. The 'base' directory likely contains native binaries (it's an unpacker emulator), and shell scripts are installed to /usr/bin. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binaries from a non-official personal host.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("http://libpcap.net/xvolkolak/xvlk_lin64_public_${pkgver}.tar.gz")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (an unpacker emulator tool) from libpcap.net, which is the maintainer's personal domain rather than the official upstream release host (which is commented out as a Dropbox URL). The comment even acknowledges the official source is the Dropbox link and that the libpcap.net mirror was set up by the maintainer via wget mirroring. This is a classic supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable is being served from a personal server controlled by the package maintainer, not the upstream author. If the maintainer's server were compromised or the maintainer acted maliciously, a different binary could be substituted. The sha256sum provides some protection against silent substitution but not against the maintainer intentionally serving a malicious binary. The 'base' directory likely contains native binaries (it's an unpacker emulator), and shell scripts are installed to /usr/bin. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binaries from a non-official personal host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Tony Lambiris <tony@libpcap.net>
2
3pkgname=xvolkolak
4pkgver=0.22
5pkgrel=3
6pkgdesc="Xvolkolak is an unpacker emulator"
7arch=(x86_64)
8url="http://n10info.blogspot.com/"
9license=(custom)
10depends=(glibc)
11# official source below
12#source=('https://www.dropbox.com/s/7sk61nc798kcg32/xvlk_lin64_public_0.22.tar.gz?dl=1')
13# wget --mirror --no-parent --convert-links --directory-prefix=xvolkolak --html-extension --restrict-file-names=windows http://n10info.blogspot.com/2018/08/xvolkolak-022.html
14source=("http://libpcap.net/xvolkolak/xvlk_lin64_public_${pkgver}.tar.gz")
15install="$pkgname.install"
16sha256sums=('4b77ce5eab33314b13b7982cffdd7526b7a8f3575945ad13aae3ec1a79d95035')
17
18package() {
19 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/share/xvolkolak" "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
20
21 cp -a "${srcdir}/xvlk_lin64_public/base" "$pkgdir/usr/share/xvolkolak/"
22 cp -a "${srcdir}/xvlk_lin64_public/xvlkc.sh" \
23 "${srcdir}/xvlk_lin64_public/xvlk.sh" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/"
24 sed -i -re 's|./base|/usr/share/xvolkolak/base|g' "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin/*.sh
25}
26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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