yad-light

maintainer sfs · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The source is an SRPM fetched from git.altlinux.org (an ALT Linux build infrastructure task URL), which is not the official upstream release host (github.com/v1cont/yad). An SRPM is an archive containing source tarballs and patches; the PKGBUILD extracts v14.1.tar.gz and patches from it. The concern is that the SRPM could contain modified sources or patches compared to the official upstream release — the maintainer is using ALT Linux's packaged version as a proxy for the upstream source rather than fetching directly from GitHub. The sha256sum pins the specific SRPM, which mitigates substitution attacks, but the integrity of the SRPM's contents relative to upstream is not independently verified. The patches applied (show-cursor-initially.patch, ru.po) come from inside this third-party SRPM. This is a genuine, if mild, supply-chain concern: executed/compiled code originates from a non-official packaging host rather than the upstream project directly. Not clearly malicious, but not clean either.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("https://git.altlinux.org/tasks/398769/build/100/x86_64/srpm/yad-14.1-alt1.src.rpm")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The source is an SRPM fetched from git.altlinux.org (an ALT Linux build infrastructure task URL), which is not the official upstream release host (github.com/v1cont/yad). An SRPM is an archive containing source tarballs and patches; the PKGBUILD extracts v14.1.tar.gz and patches from it. The concern is that the SRPM could contain modified sources or patches compared to the official upstream release — the maintainer is using ALT Linux's packaged version as a proxy for the upstream source rather than fetching directly from GitHub. The sha256sum pins the specific SRPM, which mitigates substitution attacks, but the integrity of the SRPM's contents relative to upstream is not independently verified. The patches applied (show-cursor-initially.patch, ru.po) come from inside this third-party SRPM. This is a genuine, if mild, supply-chain concern: executed/compiled code originates from a non-official packaging host rather than the upstream project directly. Not clearly malicious, but not clean either.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: sfs sfslinux@gmail.com
2
3pkgname=yad-light
4_pkgname=yad
5pkgver=14.1
6pkgrel=3
7pkgdesc='A fork of zenity - display graphical dialogs from shell scripts or command line w\o html, spell, sourceview'
8url='https://github.com/v1cont/yad'
9arch=('x86_64')
10license=('GPL3')
11depends=('gtk3')
12makedepends=('autoconf' 'automake' 'intltool')
13source=("https://git.altlinux.org/tasks/398769/build/100/x86_64/srpm/yad-14.1-alt1.src.rpm")
14sha256sums=('520dc26b56c2da198798d65a34f19f409c2d4ff8721f1ad12c2a0be460935594')
15replaces=('yad')
16provides=('yad')
17conflicts=('yad' 'yad-git' 'yad-gtk2')
18
19prepare() {
20 tar -xf v14.1.tar.gz
21 cd "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}"
22 cp ../ru.po po && echo ru >> po/LINGUAS
23# patch -Np0 -i ../fix-missing-buttons.patch
24 patch -Np1 -i ../show-cursor-initially.patch
25 # use webkit2gtk-4.1
26 sed -i 's|webkit2gtk-4.0|webkit2gtk-4.1|' configure.ac
27
28 autoreconf -ivf
29 intltoolize
30}
31
32build() {
33 cd "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}"
34
35 ./configure \
36 --prefix=/usr \
37 --enable-icon-browser \
38 --disable-html \
39 --disable-spell \
40 --disable-sourceview
41
42 make
43}
44
45package() {
46 cd "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}"
47
48 make DESTDIR="${pkgdir}" install
49}
50

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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