ydict

HIGH
maintainer DreamSaddle 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from cnblogs.com (a Chinese blogging platform, not the project's official GitHub release infrastructure) with md5sums='SKIP' (no integrity verification), then executes an arbitrary install.sh script from inside that tarball with root-level package() privileges. The combination of: (1) an unofficial, unverified binary blob from a personal blog host, (2) no checksum validation whatsoever, and (3) execution of a bundled shell script that can do anything to the system, constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk that goes beyond a typical MEDIUM concern. If cnblogs.com is compromised or the file is replaced, arbitrary code runs during package installation. This is effectively an unverified binary installer pattern — the executed shell script from an untrusted host with no integrity check elevates this to HIGH.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:18 source=("https://files.cnblogs.com/files/dream-saddle/YDict-$pkgver.tar.gz")
High AI review of an ambiguous pattern llm_review

The static rules found a suspicious pattern they could not resolve, so an AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed it and judged it HIGH (confidence 92%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from cnblogs.com (a Chinese blogging platform, not the project's official GitHub release infrastructure) with md5sums='SKIP' (no integrity verification), then executes an arbitrary install.sh script from inside that tarball with root-level package() privileges. The combination of: (1) an unofficial, unverified binary blob from a personal blog host, (2) no checksum validation whatsoever, and (3) execution of a bundled shell script that can do anything to the system, constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk that goes beyond a typical MEDIUM concern. If cnblogs.com is compromised or the file is replaced, arbitrary code runs during package installation. This is effectively an unverified binary installer pattern — the executed shell script from an untrusted host with no integrity check elevates this to HIGH.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Your Name <1289747698@qq.com>
2
3pkgname=ydict
4pkgver=0.3.2
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="dictionary/translation tool developed in Rust+Qt"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://github.com/DreamSaddle/youdao-dict"
9license=('GPL3')
10depends=()
11makedepends=()
12provides=()
13conflicts=()
14replaces=()
15backup=()
16options=()
17install=
18source=("https://files.cnblogs.com/files/dream-saddle/YDict-$pkgver.tar.gz")
19noextract=()
20md5sums=('SKIP')
21
22prepare() {
23 echo ""
24}
25
26build() {
27 echo "此软件通过打包好的二进制文件安装, 无需编译."
28}
29
30package() {
31 cd "YDict-$pkgver/scripts"
32 chmod +x install.sh
33 ./install.sh
34}
35

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 High 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 High 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 High 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 High 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 High 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 High 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 High 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 High 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 High 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 High 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 High 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 High 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 High 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 High 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 High 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 High 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 High 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 High 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 High 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 High 2

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