youku

maintainer yetist · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .deb binary (youku-app_1.0.0_amd64.deb) from mirrors.163.com, which is a NetEase-operated Ubuntu Kylin mirror rather than an official Youku/Alibaba distribution channel. The binary contains an Electron app (app.asar) that gets executed via electron9. While mirrors.163.com is a well-known Chinese mirror site and not a random personal host, the upstream source is an Alibaba-internal GitLab (gitlab.alibaba-inc.com, not publicly accessible), making independent verification of the binary's provenance impossible. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but cannot verify that the binary at that URL is the legitimate upstream release. The executed asar bundle could contain arbitrary Node.js code. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable from a non-primary host for software whose canonical source is inaccessible, though not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=('youku.deb::https://mirrors.163.com/ubuntukylin/pool/partner/youku-app_1.0.0_amd64.deb'
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .deb binary (youku-app_1.0.0_amd64.deb) from mirrors.163.com, which is a NetEase-operated Ubuntu Kylin mirror rather than an official Youku/Alibaba distribution channel. The binary contains an Electron app (app.asar) that gets executed via electron9. While mirrors.163.com is a well-known Chinese mirror site and not a random personal host, the upstream source is an Alibaba-internal GitLab (gitlab.alibaba-inc.com, not publicly accessible), making independent verification of the binary's provenance impossible. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but cannot verify that the binary at that URL is the legitimate upstream release. The executed asar bundle could contain arbitrary Node.js code. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable from a non-primary host for software whose canonical source is inaccessible, though not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Xiaotian Wu <yetist@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=youku
4pkgver=1.0.0
5pkgrel=5
6pkgdesc="YouKu Video client"
7url="http://gitlab.alibaba-inc.com/youku-node/uos-youku-app/blob/master/README.md"
8arch=('x86_64')
9license=('custom')
10depends=('electron9')
11source=('youku.deb::https://mirrors.163.com/ubuntukylin/pool/partner/youku-app_1.0.0_amd64.deb'
12 'youku.desktop'
13 'electron.sh'
14 'youku.sh'
15)
16sha256sums=('c28ade22d41fa6074fce7f2cb06f9db4dfba439698bbea37b0f5735d9ae30075'
17 '6b984c5b95804defaaa8bba57563e7dbe0a6a841712240822a1764670cd805c2'
18 '9e5af9a8e359e8b8cc3d0fb2eb4c0309fc7ace80174ca9cc93f8c5c3ef408773'
19 'c2e1562b03b6d91932a71fa7e52c3263e8e4e53b961326c3fe71bf8ac4f6ac87')
20noextract=('youku.deb')
21
22build() {
23 ar x youku.deb
24 tar xf data.tar.xz #resources
25}
26
27package() {
28
29 # App resources
30 install -Dm644 opt/优酷/resources/app.asar ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/${pkgname}/resources/${pkgname}.asar
31 cp -r opt/优酷/resources/assets ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/${pkgname}/
32 install -Dm755 ${srcdir}/electron.sh ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/${pkgname}/electron
33
34 # binary command
35 install -Dm755 youku.sh ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
36
37 # Install desktop file
38 install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/youku.desktop -t ${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/
39
40 # copy app.asar and other resource files
41 cd $srcdir/usr/share/icons
42 find . -type d -exec install -d {,"$pkgdir"/usr/share/icons/}{} \;
43 for i in `find . -type f`;do
44 install -Dm644 $i "$pkgdir"/usr/share/icons/`echo $i | tr 'A-Z' 'a-z'`
45 done
46}
47

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion