zelcore

MEDIUM
maintainer jfamousket 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
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Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (an Electron app) from zelcore.io using a URL with non-deterministic query parameters (timestamp, nonce, force-download flags). While zelcore.io is the official project domain, the URL structure is a download-manager redirect rather than a stable, versioned artifact URL. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates silent substitution risk somewhat. However: (1) the binary is a prebuilt Electron application executed directly on the user's system with no source build, (2) the URL parameters suggest a download-manager system that could serve different content at different times despite the same URL, and (3) the package was generated by debtap from a Debian package rather than built from source. The sha256 checksum provides the primary integrity guarantee, but the non-deterministic URL means the checksum could become stale or mismatched without clear indication. This is a legitimate supply-chain concern for an executed binary from a non-standard download URL, warranting a MEDIUM rating.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source_x86_64=("$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://zelcore.io/download/zelcore-for-linux-debian/?tmstv=1711476423&dlm-dp-dl-force=1&dlm-dp-dl-nonce=feb2949898")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (an Electron app) from zelcore.io using a URL with non-deterministic query parameters (timestamp, nonce, force-download flags). While zelcore.io is the official project domain, the URL structure is a download-manager redirect rather than a stable, versioned artifact URL. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates silent substitution risk somewhat. However: (1) the binary is a prebuilt Electron application executed directly on the user's system with no source build, (2) the URL parameters suggest a download-manager system that could serve different content at different times despite the same URL, and (3) the package was generated by debtap from a Debian package rather than built from source. The sha256 checksum provides the primary integrity guarantee, but the non-deterministic URL means the checksum could become stale or mismatched without clear indication. This is a legitimate supply-chain concern for an executed binary from a non-standard download URL, warranting a MEDIUM rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Generated by debtap
2# Maintainer: Famous
3# Contributor: Famous
4pkgname=zelcore
5pkgver=7.13.3
6pkgrel=0
7pkgdesc="Zelcore Platform"
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="https://zelcore.io/"
10license=('custom')
11depends=('gtk3' 'libnotify' 'nss' 'libxss' 'libxtst' 'xdg-utils' 'at-spi2-core' 'util-linux-libs' 'libsecret')
12optdepends=('libappindicator-gtk3')
13options=('!strip' '!emptydirs')
14install=${pkgname}.install
15source_x86_64=("$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://zelcore.io/download/zelcore-for-linux-debian/?tmstv=1711476423&dlm-dp-dl-force=1&dlm-dp-dl-nonce=feb2949898")
16sha256sums_x86_64=('bf01ae5e6b6565a7ad8efb213e40403455b0373ca3e78e59a72ec160025e7dc2')
17
18
19
20package(){
21
22 # Extract package data
23 tar xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
24
25 install -D -m644 "${pkgdir}/opt/ZelCore/LICENSES.chromium.html" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
26
27}
28

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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