zijiang-pos58-driver

MEDIUM
maintainer AlexanderS 2 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (a self-extracting shell script containing a tar archive) from the official vendor's own domain (zjiang.com), not a personal or third-party host. The vendor URL matches the package's stated upstream. However, the source is a prebuilt binary CUPS filter ('rastertozj58') extracted from a vendor-supplied installer zip, with no source code available for inspection. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk, but the binary itself is opaque and executed as a CUPS filter (root-adjacent, runs on every print job). This is a classic medium-risk pattern: a closed-source binary from a vendor host installed into a privileged location, not clearly malicious but not auditable. The host being the official vendor site (zjiang.com matches the package URL) reduces supply-chain concern compared to a random personal host, but the prebuilt binary nature keeps this at medium rather than clean.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=("linux-driver.zip::http://www.zjiang.com/asset/upload/14920711742402.zip")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (a self-extracting shell script containing a tar archive) from the official vendor's own domain (zjiang.com), not a personal or third-party host. The vendor URL matches the package's stated upstream. However, the source is a prebuilt binary CUPS filter ('rastertozj58') extracted from a vendor-supplied installer zip, with no source code available for inspection. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk, but the binary itself is opaque and executed as a CUPS filter (root-adjacent, runs on every print job). This is a classic medium-risk pattern: a closed-source binary from a vendor host installed into a privileged location, not clearly malicious but not auditable. The host being the official vendor site (zjiang.com matches the package URL) reduces supply-chain concern compared to a random personal host, but the prebuilt binary nature keeps this at medium rather than clean.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Alexander Sulfrian <asulfrian at zedat dot fu-berlin dot de>
2
3pkgname='zijiang-pos58-driver'
4pkgver=1.0
5pkgrel=2
6pkgdesc='Driver for the Zijiang POS58 thermal printer'
7arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
8url='http://www.zjiang.com/'
9license=('custom')
10makedepends=('unzip')
11depends=()
12source=("linux-driver.zip::http://www.zjiang.com/asset/upload/14920711742402.zip")
13sha256sums=('8faed310839377a479b62c1285ab3d9601270428e0b362ecd2e7cced02c24d92')
14
15prepare() {
16 # Unpack the installer script
17 if [ $CARCH == "x86_64" ]; then
18 sed -n -e '1,/^exit 0$/!p' Linux*/linux64*/install58 > package.tar.gz
19 else
20 sed -n -e '1,/^exit 0$/!p' Linux*/linux32*/install58 > package.tar.gz
21 fi
22 tar zxf "package.tar.gz"
23}
24
25package() {
26 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/cups/filter"
27 install "${srcdir}/bin/rastertozj58" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/cups/filter/"
28
29 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/share/cups/model/zijiang/"
30 install -m0644 "${srcdir}/ppd/POS58.ppd" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/cups/model/zijiang/"
31}
32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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